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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,

:

Case No. 940276-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-302 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1990) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

victim's eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable and
therefore admissible?
A trial court's decision to admit evidence such as an
eyewitness identification is a question of law that is reviewed
under a correctness standard.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

782 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah
1993).

However, "a correctness review necessarily incorporates a

review of the trial court's resolution of factual questions and
the associated determination of credibility that may underlie the
decision to admit[,]" which subsidiary findings will be
overturned only if clearly erroneous.

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270.

2.

Was defendant effectively represented by trial

counsel?
When reviewed solely upon the trial record, appellate
review for counsel effectiveness is necessarily conducted de
novo;

however, "[jJudicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must

be highly deferential."
689 (1984).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

See also State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah

App. 1993) ("[d]espite the application of a standard normally
bereft of deference, appellate review of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential").

Further, "[i]n cases where a trial

court has already ruled on an ineffective assistance claim, the
questions of performance and prejudice are mixed questions of law
and fact."

Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 698).

"Therefore, in a situation where a trial court has

previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, reviewing courts are free to make an independent
determination of a trial court's conclusions."
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

State v. Templin,

"The factual findings of the

trial court, however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless
clearly erroneous."
3.

Id.

Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury

verdict?
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this
Court views the evidence and all inferences that reasonably may
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert.
2

denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1933).

A jury verdict will only be

reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah

1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381.
4.

Was the trial court's imposition of the upper

minimum mandatory term proper?
Defendant has failed to provide the Court with a record
adequate to review this issue.

Consequently, the Court must

presume that the record supports the trial court's imposition of
sentence.

State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7.:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
U.S. Const. Amend VI.:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
As pertinent to the issues, other relevant text of

constitutional provisions, statutes and rules is contained in the
body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(1990) .
A jury convicted defendant as charged, following a twoday trial held on January 12-13, 1994 (R. 136).
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed
the upper minimum mandatory term of 15 years to life (R. 211).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 21, 1994, at approximately 11:50 p.m.,
Susan Norton completed her shift as a night manager at a Little
Caesar's Pizza store in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 447).

Before

going, Norton drove to a Smith's food store located at 2135 South
900 East to buy dog food (R. 447). Shortly after midnight, as
Norton returned to her car, she was assaulted by a man with a
knife (R. 452). Holding the knife to Norton's throat, the
assailant ordered her to get in the car with him (R. 452-53) .
The man successfully confined Norton inside the car for
approximately four minutes before she was able to escape (R. 46061).

Norton subseguntly identified defendant as the assailant

(R. 469-70).
A.

Eyewitness Identification

Upon arriving at the Smith's store that night, Norton
parked her car four to five feet from a big street-type light in
the lot (R. 449). She spent approximately ten minutes in the
store purchasing dog food, and then headed for her car (R. 450).
4

As Norton approached the car, she noticed that an older model
yellow Cadillac had parked next to her, facing her vehicle (R.
450, 465). Norton further noticed that a man later identified as
defendant was walking between her car and the Cadillac toward the
Smith's store (R. 451). Norton did not pay much attention to
defendant until she realized that he was walking up behind her
(R. 451). Suddenly, defendant grabbed Norton around the neck and
told her that he had a knife (R. 452).

"[Touching] the blade . .

. to [her] throat," defendant ordered, "Let's get in the car" (R.
452-53).
As Norton got into her car, she could see defendant's
feet and noticed, in particular, that he wasn't wearing any
shoes:
454-55).

"He had on -- they were just a pair of white socks" (R.
Defendant told her to "slide over" into the passenger

seat and then climbed in the driver's side, still holding the
knife in his right hand (R. 455, 457). Norton looked at the side
of defendant's face for a few seconds, noting that his hair was
light blonde, and "really curly and kinda messed up, like he
hadn't combed it" (R. 456-57, 480). Although Norton had no
specific memory that the car dome light was on at this time, it
always came on when the door was opened (R. 454).

Further, the

car dome light was operating properly both prior to and after the
incident (R. 454).
Once defendant was seated, Norton noticed that his
knife had a 2" or 3" blade and that he continued to hold it in
his right hand as he grasped the steering wheel (R. 457).
5

Defendant man demanded Norton's car keys and she handed them
over, looking directly at three quarters of his face (R. 458,
461, 480, 500). While the car's interior was "kind of shadowy,"
the parking lot light shone through the windshield (R. 461).
Norton asked defendant where he was taking her (R.
459).

Apparently referring to the radio music playing, defendant

replied that Norton had "good taste in music" (R. 459).
Defendant asked where the car lights were and turned them on (R.
459).

As defendant began to back out of the parking space,

Norton opened the passenger side door and "tried to jump out of
the car" (R. 460). Defendant grabbed her ponytail, yanking out
several strands of hair, and ordered Norton to get back in the
car (R. 4 60).

Norton pushed away from the car and yelled that

she wasn't going anywhere with him (R. 460).
B.

Additional Witnesses

Having freed herself, Norton ran toward Scott Buerkle,
who was loading his groceries into a pickup truck in the next
aisle over, approximately 40-50 feet away (R. 475, 519, 539).
Buerkle heard "a man and woman arguing," and looked toward
Norton's car where he saw
a woman in the passenger side and a man in
the driver's side. . . . [T]he passenger
side door was open, and the woman was trying
to pull herself away--pull herself out of the
passenger side and looked like the man had
ahold [sic] of her hair.
(R. 519). Buerkle heard Norton yell, "'Help me.

I don't know

this man'" (R. 519). Norton told Buerkle that the man in the car
was trying to kidnap her, and that he had put a knife to her
6

throat (R. 520). Norton and Buerkle saw the kidnapper get out of
Norton's car and run toward the yellow Cadillac (R. 464, 521) .
Buerkle then ran into the Smith's store to call police (R. 526).
Steve McGregor also witnessed the kidnapping incident.
McGregor and a co-worker, Preston Fisher had gone to Smith's to
purchase snacks for their night-shift (R. 542). McGregor waited
outside in their van while Fisher entered the store (R. 543).
McGregor watched Norton come out of the Smith's store with the
dog food (R. 543). He then watched as Buerkle loaded his
groceries (R. 553). McGregor's attention was drawn back to
Norton a minute later when he heard her scream, and saw her run
toward Buerkle (R. 543, 554).
McGregor ran toward the yellow Cadillac (R. 557). As
the Cadillac backed away from him, McGregor noticed that its
lights were off and that it had no front plate (R. 558, 564).
McGregor and Fisher immediately jumped into their van and
followed the Cadillac in an attempt to get the license plate
number (R. 545). The two men never lost sight of the Cadillac as
it exited the parking lot and proceeded southbound on 900 East
(R. 572, 579, 588, 568). The van came within two to three feet
of the Cadillac and Fisher was able to get the license plate
number at approximately the 33 00 South intersection.
C.

Police Investigation

1.

Eyewitness Accounts

Id.

Police arrived at the Smith's store approximately five
to ten minutes after the kidnapping incident (R. 468). Norton

7

described her kidnapper to Officer Cyr of the Salt Lake City
Police Department, as a white male individual in his mid-3 0's (R.
629).

Norton told Officer Cyr that the kidnapper was

approximately 5'6" to 5'7" tall and weighed approximately 150
pounds (R. 629). She characterized the kidnapper as small built
(R. 629). Norton further described her kidnapper's face as clean
shaven, and his hair as shoulder length,1 curly and blonde (R.
629).

She also noted that he was wearing white socks and no

shoes (R. 629). Norton told Officer Cyr she was uncertain about
the color of the kidnapper's shirt or pants, but thought that he
might have been wearing brown, Docker style slacks (R. 630).
Although lighting conditions in the parking lot were
dim, Buerkle reported that he was able to determine that the
kidnapper was a white male, weighed approximately 160-170 pounds,
and had blonde or brownish hair with a receding hair line (R.
522).

Buerkle estimated that the kidnapper was approximately 35

years old and described the kidnapper's car as 1976 or 1977
yellow Cadillac (R. 521-22).
McGregor told police the kidnapper was approximately
30-38 years old, 5'7" tall, 160 pounds and had medium length hair
(R. 565). McGregor and Fisher described the kidnapper's car as a
white on yellow Cadillac (R. 567, 580).

In following the

Cadillac out of the parking lot, McGregor noted no major damage,
observing instead that the Cadillac appeared to be a "real clean
1

While the officer's report indicated that Norton had
described shoulder length hair, Norton recalled describing only
collar length hair (R. 286).
8

car" (R. 568-69; State's Exh. ##6-7, 17; Defense Exh. ##15-16,
18) .
2.

Registration Check of Suspect Cadillac

Police ran a registration check on the license plate
number reported to them by McGregor and Fisher and found that the
Cadillac was registered to Shandra Winters (R. 654). Several
police officers responded to Winters' Salt Lake City address at
approximately 1:00 a.m., where they observed a yellow Cadillac
parked outside (R. 631, 661, 668-69) . Defendant answered the
officers' knock, wearing a towel around his waist (R. 657).
Officer Cyr noted that defendant substantially matched the
witness's physical descriptions of the kidnapper except that
defendant appeared slightly taller, heavier, and his hair a
little shorter than had been described (R. 632).
3. Incriminating Evidence Observed in
Defendant's Living Room
With defendant's permission, police entered his living
room where they observed several items spread out on a coffee
table including a pocket-type knife with an approximate 2" blade
(R. 633, State's Exh. #9). Officer Cyr also observed defendant's
shoes and socks and noted particularly that the white socks were
soiled on the bottom (R. 634, State's Exh. #19).
4.

Defendant's Pre-arrest Statements

Defendant told the police that he had been at a bar
earlier in the evening and that he had been the only one driving
the Cadillac that night (R. 634-35, 670). Police allowed
defendant to dress himself and then asked him to step outside on
9

the porch for an identification procedure (R. 659).

Defendant

responded, " x 0h great, I'm going to jail'" (R. 659).
5.

Showup Identification

Officer Cyr brought Norton to defendant's apartment
that same night and told her that "he was going to ask [her] to
identify the person that was there" (R. 468-69) . With Norton
sitting in the front seat, Officer Cyr drove his patrol vehicle
"up onto the lawn so that his lights were shining on the person
who was standing there" (R. 469). Norton noticed that "there was
another officer standing to the left, (of the suspect) and . . .
a couple more officers on the other side" (R. 469). Officer Cyr
asked Norton "if the man standing on the porch [,] who didn't have
a shirt on, if he was the individual who had attempted to kidnap
[her]" (R. 469). Norton thought that defendant looked like the
kidnapper, but asked Officer Cyr to pull closer (R. 469). The
officer then pulled to within 40 feet of defendant's porch (R.
469).

Norton looked at defendant for an additional 3 0 seconds

and positively identified him as the kidnapper:

"From the front,

when I was watching him, his hair was the same color and it was
curly like--probably because it's naturally curly.

And he looked

about the same height and build" (R. 470).
Following Norton's identification, defendant was
arrested and charged with aggravated kidnapping (R. 7-8). At the
time of his arrest, defendant was 5'9" tall, weighed 170 pounds,
and had collar length blonde hair and a slight blond mustache (R.
650; Defense Exh. #2).
10

6.

Defendant's Post-arrest Statement

Officer Ziegler of the Salt Lake Police Department
transported defendant to jail (R. 671-72).

On the way, defendant

made the comment, "That female has nothing on me" (R. 672).
Officer Ziegler had not personally, nor had he heard any other
officer tell defendant that the victim was female (R. 673). When
Officer Ziegler asked the other officers if they had so informed
defendant, they replied that they had not (R. 673). Officer Cyr
specifically recalled telling defendant that he was there to
investigate "a crime" and had not informed defendant that the
victim was female (R. 675).
D.

Motion to Suppress Denied

Defendant filed a motion to suppress Norton's
eyewitness identification on the ground that the identification
was unreliable and its admission would violate his federal and
state constitutional rights (R. 27-28) (a copy is attached as
Addendum A ) .

Following a hearing, the trial court denied

defendant's motion (R. 347-52), and entered detailed Findings of
Fact (R. 162-66) (a complete copy of the court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law is contained in Addendum B ) .

The trial

court concluded that "defendant's due process rights were not
violated by the *show up' identification procedure," and
therefore the victim's identification of him was admissible (R.
167), see Addendum B.
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E.

Trial Strategy

Defendant continued to challenge the reliability of the
victim's eyewitness identification at trial, pointing out alleged
inconsistencies in the identification.

In cross-examining

Norton, trial counsel2 established that the knife seized from
defendant's apartment had a broken blade, but that Norton had
described the knife to police as having a curved or rounded tip
(R. 502, 515, State's Exh. #9). Trial counsel also challenged
Norton's description of the assailant's hair, pointing out that
Officer Cyr's report indicated that Norton had described the
kidnapper's hair as shoulder length (R. 490). On crossexamination of Officer Cyr, trial counsel established that while
Norton had described the kidnapper as possibly wearing brown
Docker style pants, police had not seized any pants fitting that
description from defendant's apartment (R. 645).
Additionally, trial counsel emphasized the fact that
none of the other witnesses to the kidnapping had been able to
positively identify defendant as the kidnapper at a police lineup held approximately two months after the incident (R. 53 7,
569).

Further, trial counsel emphasized that McGregor and Fisher

had described the suspect Cadillac as having a white top and that
defendant's Cadillac was solid yellow (R. 568, 580; Defense Exh.
##15-16, 18) .

Defense counsel further brought out that Fisher

2

At trial, defendant was represented by Mark Moffat (R.
16). Moffat withdrew from the case following trial and current
counsel was appointed (R. 173, 175).
12

had one occasion described the Cadillac as having a dark top (R.
593) .
Defendant's only witness was Shandra Winters, who
claimed ownership of the knife seized from the apartment she
shared with defendant (R. 690). Winters claimed that she had
left the knife on the coffee table on September 20, 1993 and that
as far as she knew the knife remained there until seized by
police on September 21, 1993 (R. 691).
F.

Motion for New Trial Denied

Current counsel filed a motion for new trial alleging
that defendant's trial counsel had provided ineffective
assistance (R. 189) (a copy is attached as Addendum C).
A supporting memorandum and accompanying affidavit from defendant
asserted that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate
alleged alibi witnesses (R. 191-93, 195-97).

Following an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 232),
and issued detailed findings (R. 225-30) (a complete copy of the
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law is attached as
Addendum D).

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that there

was "no error or impropriety" in defendant's trial "which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of defendant[,]" and
that it "[was] not in the interest of justice to grant defendant
a new trial" (R. 230), see Addendum D.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted the victim's
eyewitness identification of defendant based on its determination
13

that the showup identification was reliable under stringent state
constitutional standards set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774 (Utah 1991).

Defendant's challenge to the trial court's

reliability findings fails to demonstrate that the court's ruling
is without adequate basis in the record.
Defendant was afforded the effective assistance of
trial counsel.

Defendant's allegations regarding the adequacy of

trial counsel's investigation was raised below in a motion for
new trial and expressly rejected.

His allegations of

ineffectiveness on appeal fail to demonstrate any clear error in
the trial court's factual findings; nor do they demonstrate any
deficiency in the investigation actually conducted.

Moreover,

defendant wholly fails to explain how trial counsel's alleged
failure to investigate prejudiced his case.

Either failure is

sufficient ground for the Court to reject defendant's claim.
Defendant's further complaint that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a lesser included offense
instruction on aggravated assault similarly fails.

The record is

replete with indication that an aggravated assault instruction
did not fit defendant's theory of the case below.

Indeed, it was

contrary to trial counsel's "all or nothing" misidentification
strategy.

Because there is a plausible strategic purpose for

trial counsel's decision not to request the instruction, that
decision does not amount to deficient performance.

Defendant

fails to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced as a
consequence of trial counsel's strategy.
14

Again, the Court may

reject defendant's allegation of ineffectiveness on either
ground.
There is ample evidence to support the jury verdict.
Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, he was not able to
successfully detain the victim for a "substantial period;" thus,
his conviction for aggravated kidnapping is not justified.
However, defendant has neither marshalled the evidence supporting
the jury's determination that the victim was detained for
purposes of the aggravated kidnapping statute, nor demonstrated
that it was insufficient to support the jury verdict.

Even

assuming the Court were to read a "substantial period"
requirement into the aggravated kidnapping statute, defendant's
confinement of the victim constitutes a substantial, punishable
offense.
Finally, the trial court's imposition of a 15 year
minimum mandatory term is presumptively proper.

Defendant has

failed to provide an adequate record for this Court to review his
claim of error:

Neither the sentencing transcript, nor the pre-

sentence report are included.

The incomplete record further

hampers the Court's ability to determine if the precise issue
defendant has attempted to raise on appeal was properly preserved
below.

Additionally, defendant's allegation of error fails to

comply with the briefing rule in that it is devoid of supporting
legal authority.

Based on the foregoing, the Court should reject

defendant's assertion of error and presume the correctness of the
sentence imposed.
15

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE VICTIM'S
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS STANDARDS
SET FORTH IN STATE V. RAMIREZ
In Point I of his brief defendant alleges that the
victim's eyewitness identification of him shortly after the
aggravated kidnapping was not reliable and was also unduly
suggestive under both state and federal constitutional
provisions.

Br. of App. at 11, 17.

In State v. Ramirez, the

Utah Supreme Court set forth a state constitutional analysis for
determining the "due process reliability of eyewitness
identifications" which "is certainly as stringent as, if not more
stringent than, the federal analysis[.]"
(Utah 1991).

817 P.2d 774, 780, 784

The trial court considered the more stringent

Ramirez analysis in denying defendant's motion to suppress below
and concluded that the showup identification procedure employed
by police did not violate defendant's constitutional rights (R.
167).

This Court should affirm the trial court's reliability

determination.
A.

Ramirez Standard

Under Ramirez, fl[t]he ultimate question to be
determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
the identification was reliable."

817 P.2d at 781; State v.

Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App. 1992).

To assist that

determination, the supreme court listed five "pertinent factors"
by which eyewitness reliability could be determined:
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(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's.
817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 p.2d 483, 493 (Utah
1986) ) .
B. Trial Court's Ramirez Findings Are
Supported in The Record
The trial court considered the foregoing factors in
determining that "defendant's due process rights were not
violated by the

x

show up' identification procedure" utilized here

(R. 167), see Addendum B.

On appeal, defendant makes no express

challenge to the trial court's findings under the third or fifth
prongs of the Ramirez analysis.

Br. of App. at 18-20.

Rather,

he challenges the trial court's factual findings under the first,
second and fourth Ramirez prongs.

Br. of App. at 18-20.

Specifically, defendant challenges the trial court's factual
findings concerning Norton's opportunity to view defendant during
the incident; her degree of attention to him; and the consistency
of her identification and whether it was the product of improper
suggestion.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.

17

The trial court's factual findings concerning these
matters are entitled to deference on appeal and may be overturned
only if clearly erroneous.
1993).

State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah

"When challenging a trial court's factual findings, xthe

appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'"

State

v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)).
Defendant has not marshalled any evidence supporting
the trial court's findings.

Br. of App. at 8-22.

Rather,

defendant re-argues the evidence presented below in the light
most favorable to him, leaving it to this Court to sort out the
evidence supporting the trial court's ruling.
823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Scheel,

Accordingly, this Court must

reject defendant's allegation of a constitutional violation and
instead assume the correctness of the trial court's findings to
the contrary.

State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.),

cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355
(Utah 1993).
Even assuming defendant's challenge is properly before
the Court, the trial court's Ramirez findings are based on
essentially uncontroverted evidence and are well supported in the
record.
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1.

Opportunity to View

With regard to the first Ramirez prong,
pertinent circumstances include the length of
time the witness viewed the actor; the
distance between the witness and the actor;
whether the witness could view the actor's
face; the lighting or lack of it; whether
there were distracting noises or activity
during the observation; and any other
circumstances affecting the witness's
opportunity to observe the actor.
817 P.2d at 782. The record provides ample support for the trial
court's determination that Norton had sufficient opportunity to
view defendant (R. 162-167), see Addendum B.

Norton estimated

that she was inside her car with defendant for approximately four
minutes, during which time she spent approximately 20 seconds
looking directly at defendant's profile and/or at least three
quarters of his face (R. 281, 302-03, 311-12) . Specifically,
Norton looked directly at defendant as he entered the driver's
seat, and again when he demanded that she hand over her car keys
(R. 262-63, 302-03).

The trial court found that these

observations were made from as close as two feet (R. 163), see
Addendum B.
Although it was nighttime, Norton's car dome light
likely illuminated defendant as he entered the driver's seat and
before he shut the driver's side door (R. 262, 277, 280, 297).
And, while it was "shadowy" inside the car, the parking lot light
shone through the windshield (R. 297, 306, 461). Id.
Additionally, Norton viewed defendant outside her car
as he ran away following her escape (R. 265). From a distance of
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approximately 30 to 35 feet (R. 283), Norton estimated that
defendant was approximately 5'7" tall and weighed approximately
150 to 160 pounds (R. 265). Norton's visual estimation of
defendant's height and weight corroborated her earlier
impressions and observations concerning defendant's height and
weight when he initially pressed up against her back and ordered
her into the

car (R. 275-76, 313). The record is devoid of

indication that there was any distracting activity, noise or
other circumstance affecting Norton's opportunity to observe and
focus upon defendant.
2.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.

Degree of Attention

For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that
Norton "was distracted during the time she had an opportunity to
observe the perpetrator's head and face, by considerations such
as watching the knife in his hand, and trying to escape."
App. at 18.

This particular assertion was not raised below and

is therefore waived.
App. 1993) .

Br. of

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah

Defendant has not asserted that there are unusual

circumstances justifying his failure to present this precise
ground for suppression.

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922

(Utah App. 1991).
In any event, in considering the second Ramirez prong,
the trial court found that Norton "observed [defendant] with some
thought of being able to later identify him" (R. 164). Again,
the court's finding is well supported in the record.

Norton

received crime prevention training in her work as night manager
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of a pizza store and looked directly at defendant with the
specific purpose of remembering him for later identification
purposes (R. 315). Significantly, the record is devoid of
indication that any other actor was involved.

See Ramirez, 817

P.2d at 783 (noting that victim was able to concentrate on
defendant, despite the threats and assaultive acts of another
actor).
3.

Consistency of Identification

Regarding the fourth Ramirez prong,
relevant circumstances include the length of
time that passed between the witness's
observation at the time of the event and the
identification of defendant; the witness's
mental capacity and state of mind at the time
of the identification; the witness's exposure
to opinions, descriptions, identifications,
or other information from other sources;
instances when the witness or other
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify
defendant; instances when the witness or
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the
actor that is inconsistent with defendant;
and the circumstances under which defendant
was presented to the witness for
identification.
817 P.2d at 783.
On appeal, defendant claims that the victim's
eyewitness identification fails under this prong because Norton's
description of the length of his hair "has not 'remained
consistent' during the investigation of this case."

Br. of App.

at 18. However, this is not the precise assertion raised below,
Brown, 856 P.2d at 359-60, and defendant has not asserted that
there are unusual circumstances justifying his failure to present
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this precise ground for suppression.
922.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d at

It is therefore not properly before the Court.

Ibid.

At the suppression hearing below, defendant argued only
that Norton's initial description of him was inconsistent with
his actual appearance (R. 343). Rejecting defendant's argument,
the trial court found that any inconsistencies between Norton's
description of defendant and his actual appearance were "minor"
(R. 166), see Addendum B.
The court's finding is well established in the record.
Norton consistently described defendant's hair as blonde, curly,
unkempt and approximately collar length (R. 262, 268, 285-86,
298).

Significantly, trial counsel questioned Norton as to why

Officer Cyr's report indicated that she had described the
kidnapper as having shoulder length (R. 285-86) .

Norton

explained she recalled telling the officer that defendant's hair
was collar length, not shoulder length (R. 286). Norton further
explained that defendant's hair was " [n]ot real short, wasn't
[sic] a missionary haircut or anything" (R. 286/ Defense Exh. #2
(booking photo)).

In any event, any difference between Norton's

initial description of defendant and his actual appearance bears
on Norton's credibility and on the weight jurors may accord her
testimony, but does not alone make her identification
inadmissible.

State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App.),

cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
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4.

No Improper Suggestion

Finally, defendant claims that the showup
identification was improperly suggestive because Norton was
informed that the individual she was being asked to identify
owned the yellow Cadillac and also matched her description of the
kidnapper.

Br. of App. at 19. Defendant also complains that the

showup was improperly suggestive because he was the only nonofficer on the porch at the time.

Id.

The trial court determined that there was nothing
"blatantly suggestive" or "unduly prejudicial" in the manner in
which the "'show up'" was conducted" (R. 166), see Addendum B.
Defendant's complaints fail to demonstrate that the trial court's
finding is without basis in the record.

Indeed, the complained

of circumstances are hardly distinguishable from those in
Ramirez.

As in the present case, Ramirez was "the only person at

the showup who was not a police officer."

817 P.2d at 784.

Further, the Ramirez eyewitness was similarly informed that
police had apprehended someone who fit his description of the
culprit.

Id.

The supreme court held that while the foregoing

circumstances "may not of themselves be unnecessarily suggestive,
they must be considered as part of the circumstances surrounding
the identification procedure."

Id.

Thus, necessarily deferring

to the trial court's resolution of the factual issues and ability
to appraise demeanor evidence, the supreme court ultimately
upheld the Ramirez procedure.

Id.
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If, as defendant claims, the instant showup
identification is distinguishable from that in Ramirez, it is not
distinguishable in a manner favorable to defendant.

For example,

Ramirez "stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence behind
his back."
not

817 P.2d at 784.

Defendant, on the other hand, was

handcuffed and merely stood on the porch of his own home (R.

165), see Addendum B.

Perhaps more importantly, there were

racial differences between Ramirez and the eyewitness in that
case but, Norton and the defendant are of the same racial
identity (R. 164), see Addendum B.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784

(noting that "differences in racial characteristics" between
eyewitness and defendant can raise additional questions about the
identification).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly
determined that Norton's eyewitness identification was reliable.
Certainly, the instant identification is less problematic than
that upheld in Ramirez.

Considering the totality of the

circumstances, defendant's complaints simply fail to establish
that the court's reliability ruling is without adequate record
support.

Id. at 781.

Accordingly, the court's admissibility

ruling should be affirmed.3

3

Because the state constitutional standards applied by
the trial court are more stringent than those set forth in Neil
v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), there is no need to engage in
the less rigorous federal constitutional analysis.
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POINT 1.
DEFENDANT WAS PROVIDED WITH THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
In Point II of his brief defendant alleges that he was
denied effective representation by his trial counsel.

Br. of

App. at 23. Defendant bases his claim of ineffective assistance
on two grounds:

1) trial counsel's alleged failure to

investigate potential alibi witnesses; and 2) trial counsel's
failure to request an instruction on the lesser included offense
of aggravated assault.

Defendant's allegations of

ineffectiveness are not supported by a review of the record;
rather, he was effectively represented by his trial counsel, Mark
Moffat, Salt Lake Legal Defender's Office.
A.

Effective Representation Standard

In determining whether criminal defendants have been
denied effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment
right to counsel,4 Utah courts have consistently followed the
two-part test outlined in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
4

Defendant has not articulated a separate state
constitutional analysis of his ineffectiveness claim either in
the trial court, or on appeal to this Court. Accordingly, the
State's analysis is limited to consideration of defendant's
allegations under the sixth amendment.
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showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687.

Defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of

the Strickland test.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah

1990); State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993).
In order to meet the first part of Strickland, a
defendant must identify the act or omissions which show that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy.

Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465.

Indeed, "this

[C]ourt will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in
retrospect."

Id.

In order to meet the second part of Strickland, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
" x but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.'11

Tennyson, 850 P. 2d at

466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

"A reasonable

probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the
confidence in the reliability of the outcome."

State v. Tyler,

850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993).
B. Trial Counsel Adequately Investigated
Defendant's Case
Defendant claims that he told his trial counsel that he
was at a local bar until 12:30 a.m., on the night of incident and
that he also "advised his trial counsel of potential alibi
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witnesses."

Br. of App. at 23. He complains that trial counsel

failed to investigate these witnesses, depriving him of
"substantial exculpatory information" at trial.

Br. of App. at

26-27.
Current defense counsel filed a motion for new trial
alleging the above grounds (R. 189, 191-93, 195-97), see Addendum
C.

An evidentiary hearing was held wherein defendant and his

trial counsel testified.

Upon consideration of that evidence,

the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 232), expressly
finding defendant's claims incredible (R. 229), see Addendum D.
The trial court's findings are supported by the record
which is devoid of indication that trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate defendant's case, or that trial counsel's
decisions were unreasonable.

Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 ("[i]t is

only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can
make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons").

Indeed, trial counsel

initially directed his investigator to find the alleged bar
patrons (R. 773). However, when the investigator was unable to
contact any of the alleged witnesses, trial counsel made the
determination that the investigator's efforts would be better
spent locating and investigating the State's eyewitnesses (R.
773-74).
Trial counsel's decision was strategic and reasonable
in light of the fact that defendant told him that he left the bar
at 11:45 p.m., on the night of the kidnapping which occurred
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approximately one half hour later at 12:15 p.m. (R. 771-71, 775).
Thus, as expressly found by the trial court, even if trial
counsel had been able to locate the bar patrons, and even if the
bar patrons had been able to place defendant at the bar that
night, their testimony was simply not exculpatory to defendant
because "defendant easily could have driven from the location of
the bar to the location where the offense occurred between 11:45
p.m. and 12:15 a.m." (R. 229), see Addendum D.

See State v.

Strain, No. 910440-CA, slip op. at 10 (Utah App. November 17,
1994) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance for failure to
investigate nonsensical and tangential issues on ground that
counsel "might have validly determined that trial preparation
time would be better spent on other avenues more likely to assist
defendant").
As for defendant's complaint that trial counsel did not
personally attempt to investigate the whereabouts of the alleged
bar patrons, Br. of App. at 24, the record and defendant's brief
are devoid of indication how trial counsel's personal attempts
would have yielded information any different from that obtained
by the investigator.

Cf. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255 (trial counsel

not required to personally investigate crime scene where she
filed discovery request for all reports and investigations of
prosecution and was provided with such "because [she] presumably
obtained the same information as she would have obtained had she
performed an independent investigation").
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The trial court's factual findings rejecting
defendant's allegation of trial counsel's ineffectiveness are
entitled to deference on appeal and may be overturned only if
clearly erroneous.

State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1993).

See Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186.

As the appellant, it is

defendant's burden to "marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'11

State

v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah App. 1992 (quoting State
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)).
Defendant has not met his marshalling burden here.
Rather, relying solely on his own version of his alleged
discussions with trial counsel, defendant attempts to argue that
trial counsel failed to investigate substantial exculpatory
information.

Br. of App. at 26-27.

Because defendant has not

properly marshalled the evidence, this Court must reject
defendant's allegations and instead assume the correctness of the
trial court's findings to the contrary.

State v. Larsen, 828

P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993); State v. Scheel, 823
P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991).
Based on the foregoing, defendant's complaints about
trial counsel's investigation fail to demonstrate any deficiency
in trial counsel's performance.

Moreover, defendant fails to

articulate any resultant prejudice.
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Neither the record, nor

defendant's brief identify the alleged bar patrons, much less the
substance of their testimony.

State v Callahan, 866 P.2d 590,

593 (Utah App. 1993) (record failed to support Callahan's claim
of that defense counsel failed to interview and subpoena
prospective defense witnesses where no indication therein of
witness's identity and/or their purported testimony).

For all

this Court knows, the alleged witnesses do not exist and, if so,
may not necessarily testify favorably for defendant.

State v.

Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (rejecting claim
of inadequate investigation where record failed to indicate
whether alleged potential witnesses would have even testified
favorably for defendant).
C. Trial Counsel's Consideration of Lesser
Included Jury Instructions Was Proper
Relying solely on State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah
1984), defendant claims that his trial counsel was further
ineffective in failing to request a lesser included offense
instruction on the specific offense of aggravated assault.
of App. at 28.

Br.

However, the aggravated assault instruction did

not fit defendant's theory of the case below; consequently, his
second claim of ineffectiveness similarly fails.

Butterfield v.

Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 338 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651
(Utah 1991).

See Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)

(where it is possible to "articulate [a] plausible strategic
explanation for trial counsel's behavior" ineffectiveness claims
must fail) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
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Defendant's allegation concerning trial counsel's
failure to request the aggravated assault instruction is raised
for the first time on direct appeal without a prior evidentiary
hearing.
law.

Therefore, the Court reviews the claim as a question of

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).

However, the Court's review of trial counsel's performance must
be highly deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's
performance

,M

on the basis of an inanimate record.'"

Callahan,

866 P.2d at 593.
1.

No Deficient Performance

The record on appeal provides no basis to find that
counsel's failure to request an aggravated assault instruction
was objectively deficient.

Deficient performance does not exist

unless there is a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for
counsel's actions,"

State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah

App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993), and this Court must presume that trial counsel "made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688.

Defendant's reliance on State v. Brown, fails to
further his assertion of ineffective assistance in this case.
While Brown and defendant were both convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, the similarity between the two cases ends there.
Brown's trial strategy was to testify that the victim started the
altercation and that he simply responded to her behavior, thus,
Brown admitted his culpability for the lesser offense of assault.
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Id. at 590. On appeal, Brown alleged trial court error for
failure to give his requested

assault instruction.

Id. at 589.

The supreme court agreed with Brown's assertion of
trial court error, finding that assault was necessarily an
included offense of kidnapping.

Id. at 589-99.

The supreme

court determined that although "[Brown's] testimony may not have
appeared particularly credible[,]" if believed by the jury, it
nonetheless established a "'rational basis'" in the evidence for
a verdict acquitting Brown of kidnapping and convicting him of
assault.

Id.

Significantly, because Brown was decided on the

basis of trial court

error, as opposed to trial counsel

error,

the case does not address the legitimacy of alternative
strategies that are necessarily raised when, as here, trial
counsel's chosen strategy is challenged.
In the present case, trial counsel's strategy was to
attack the reliability of the victim's eyewitness identification,
not

to admit defendant's involvement in a lesser offense like

aggravated assault (R. 752). Defendant's strategy is apparent in
his motion to suppress the victim's eyewitness identification (R.
27-28), opening statement (R. 443), extensive cross-examination
of the victim and Officer Cyr (R. 471-508, 514-16, 641-50), and
his closing argument (R. 718-25).

Trial counsel challenged the

both the consistency and the accuracy of the victim's description
of the kidnapper's hair, height, weight, clothing and knife.
Ibid.

The misidentification approach constitutes a legitimate

"all or nothing" defense:

If the misidentification strategy had
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created a reasonable doubt that Norton correctly identified
defendant, defendant would have been acquitted.
Moreover, trial counsel did request (R. 61), and the
trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of
kidnapping (R. 99). Thus, in absence of record evidence to the
contrary, this Court must presume that trial counsel actively
considered the various lesser included offense instructions
available and made a reasonable tactical decision not to request
an aggravated assault instruction.

Cf. State v. Cosev, 873' P.2d

1177 (Utah App.) (absent showing that trial counsel "failed to
reasonably participate" in jury selection process, Court rejected
ineffectiveness claim in favor of "'strong presumption that trial
counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment'") (citation omitted), cert, denied,
P.2d

(Utah, August 19, 1994).
In the present case the Court can do more than presume

that trial counsel considered and reasonably decided against
requesting an aggravated assault instruction.

Indeed, at a

hearing on trial counsel's motion to withdraw, trial counsel
expressly noted that to have requested an aggravated assault
instruction would have been "incompatible" with his primary
misidentification strategy (R. 752). See Kubat v. Thieret, 867
F.2d 351, 364-65 (7th Cir.) (no ineffective assistance where
trial counsel could reasonably have chosen not to submit the a
lesser included instruction to avoid weakening alibi defense),
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
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Further, unlike an aggravated assault instruction, the
kidnapping instruction given here was not necessarily
inconsistent with trial counsel's "all or nothing"
misidentification strategy, and at the same time, afforded the
jury an opportunity to convict defendant of a lesser offense.

By

requesting the kidnapping instruction, trial counsel was able to
consistently argue that Norton had misidentified the kidnapper,
and that the State's evidence was also insufficient to establish
aggravating circumstances.

Even if the jury believed that Norton

had correctly identified defendant, trial counsel could still
attack the State's failure to establish aggravating circumstances
and, on that ground, argue that defendant was at most guilty only
of kidnapping.

Indeed, trial counsel presented this precise

argument in a motion to dismiss as the close of the State's casein-chief (R. 687-88) . Further, trial counsel may have reasoned
that if he successfully persuaded the jury there were
insufficient aggravating circumstances to justify an aggravated
kidnapping verdict, the jury, in its consideration of the lesser
kidnapping charge, could determine that the three to four minute
period of detention in this case was too minimal to justify a
conviction and acquit defendant of that offense as well.5

5

Although it was not part of defendant's trial strategy
below, in Point III of his brief on appeal defendant has attacked
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
aggravated kidnapping on the ground that, as a matter of law, the
period of Ms. Norton's detention was too minimal to constitute
kidnapping under State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). See
Br. of App. at 29-32. The State's refutation of defendant's
claim is set forth in Point III of this brief.
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On the other hand, in order for the jury to convict
defendant of aggravated assault, trial counsel would have had to
abandon his "all or nothing" misidentification strategy and
persuade the jury not only that defendant was correctly
identified as the assailant, but that he had also used a knife.
Because this scenario is virtually indistinguishable from the
conduct alleged to constitute aggravated kidnapping, trial
counsel reasonably decided against requesting the aggravated
assault instruction.

For example, defendant's use of a knife

constitutes the aggravating circumstance for both aggravated
assault and aggravated kidnapping.

On the facts of this case,

the only circumstance differentiating the aggravated assault from
the more egregious aggravated kidnapping offense is the "three to
four minute" detention immediately following the aggravated
assault.

Accordingly, trial counsel may have legitimately feared

that the jury, believing his client had threatened Norton with a
knife, would harbor no sympathy and convict defendant of the more
egregious offense.
Based on the foregoing, defendant's assertion of
ineffectiveness fails to establish any deficiency in trial
counsel's performance.

As recognized in Tennyson, "authority

from this [C]ourt supports the notion that an ineffective
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."
P.2d at 468.

850

The record in this case is replete with indications

that trial counsel's misidentification strategy was well
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considered.

The Court should reject defendant's ineffectiveness

claim on that ground.
2.

Id. at 466.

No Unfair Prejudice

Defendant has not even attempted to demonstrate that
there was a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the
jury been instructed on the lesser aggravated assault offense.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694);
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258.

This failure is also reason, in and of

itself, to reject defendant's claim.

State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d

1207, 1210 (Utah App. 1991) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim on
ground that Morgan's "naked assertion11 of error, "without any
underlying analysis, [fell] far short of [his] burden").
Moreover, as evidenced by the verdict, the jury
believed Norton's uncontradicted testimony concerning defendant's
identity, his threatening use of the knife, and her three to four
minute confinement inside the car.

See, e.g., State v. Archuleta

747 P.2d 1019, 1024-25 n.3 (Utah 1987) (where victim's
uncontradicted testimony established all the elements of rape,
absent some evidence to support a jury's convicting defendant of
a lesser included offense, defendant cannot complain that defense
counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request
an instruction on such an offense).

Any argument to be made

concerning the existence of aggravating circumstances (necessary
to justify an aggravated assault instruction), simply supports
Norton's credibility.

Consequently, the only way defendant can

show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request
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an aggravated assault instruction is to argue that, as a matter
of law, his detention of Norton did not last for a sufficient
period to constitute kidnapping.6
Even if the Court were to determine that, as a matter
of law, Norton was not detained long enough to constitute
aggravated kidnapping, defendant is not entitled to have his
first degree felony conviction reduced to aggravated assault, a
third degree felony.

Rather, the three to four minute period of

confinement accomplished here certainly constitutes at least a
"substantial step" toward the commission of aggravated
kidnapping.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1994) ("For purposes

of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting
a substantial step toward commission of the offense").

As

defendant does not dispute that the elements of aggravated
kidnapping are otherwise established by the uncontradicted
testimony of the victim,7 he is at most entitled to entry of a
conviction for attempted aggravated kidnapping, a second degree
felony.

See n.5, supra.
See Point III, infra.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPPING
Relying solely on State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah
1981) defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping.
29.

Br. of App. at

The crux of defendant's Couch argument is that the period of

detention in this case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
constitute kidnapping.

Br. of App. at 29-32.

Defendant's

reliance on Couch is misplaced and fails to support his claim.
In State v. Couch, the Utah Supreme Court considered a
similar sufficiency challenge to a conviction for kidnapping.
635 P.2d at 92.

Defendant Couch offered to drive the victim and

two of her friends home in the victim's car.

After dropping off

the victim's friends, Couch drove by the victim's home without
stopping.

The victim protested but Couch continued driving for

some distance.

Eventually, Couch turned off the freeway and

stopped in a deserted place where he sexually assaulted the
victim.

Couch then drove the victim to a nearby town where he

got out at a motel, leaving the victim to drive herself home.
Id. at 91-92.
On appeal, Couch argued that his detention of the
victim was "merely incidental to the crime of aggravated sexual
assault and in effect a lesser included offense that should not
be the basis for a separate conviction."

Id. at 92.

In

considering Couch's claim, the supreme court recognized a general
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concern with kidnapping statutes that do not specify the duration
of time or the circumstances under which a victim must be
detained for a kidnap to occur.

Id. at 92. The supreme court

noted that a "literal application of such statutes could
transform virtually every rape and robbery into a kidnapping as
well."

Id.

Indeed, the court noted that a "defendant convicted

of both kidnapping and what can be termed a 'host crime' would in
many cases receive a significantly heavier sentence than if only
the host crime had been charged."

Id.

In contrast, the supreme court noted that Utah's
kidnapping statute "expressly limits the circumstances under
which a detention will constitute kidnapping."

Id.8

The

supreme court interpreted Utah's statute as requiring
satisfaction of one or the other conditions:

Either the victim

must be held for a "substantial period," or, the circumstances of
the detention must expose the victim to risk of serious bodily

8

Then, as now, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1990)

provides:
(1) A person commits kidnapping when he
intentionally or knowingly and without
authority of law and against the will of the
victim:
(a) Detains or restrains another for any
substantial period; or
(b) Detains or restrains another in
circumstances exposing him to risk of serious
bodily injury; . . .
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injury.

Id. at 93.

In determining what constitutes a

"substantial period," the supreme court expressly noted that it
"can be defined only by reference to a specific fact situation,"
but that "a period of detention longer than the minimum inherent
in the commission of a rape or a robbery" is required.

Id.

The

supreme court found that Couch's conviction was sustainable under
either theory because, "the kidnapping was not merely incidental
or subsidiary to some other crime, but was an independent,
separately punishable offense."

Id.

The instant facts similarly support defendant's
conviction for aggravated kidnapping.

This is not a case where

the kidnapping incidentally facilitated a "host crime," thereby
exposing defendant to the risk of a "cumulative penalty."
at 92-93.

Couch

Rather, the aggravated assault in this case was

completed and in fact made possible defendant's subsequent and
independent act of kidnap.

Specifically, defendant grabbed

Norton from behind, and touched the blade of his knife to her
throat (R. 452). Defendant then ordered, "Let's get in the car"
(R. 452-53).
assault.9
9

Such conduct clearly constitutes aggravated

Evidence of Norton's detention beyond this point adds
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990):
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force
40

nothing to the completed aggravated assault but rather,
constitutes aggravated kidnapping.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-

302(1)(c) (1990) ("A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and
against the will of the victim, by any means, and in any manner,
seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim with intent:
. . . To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another [.]").10
Indeed, defendant forced Norton into her car and
ordered her to "slide over" into the passenger seat (R. 454-57).
He then climbed in the driver's side door, holding the knife in
his right hand (R. 455-57).

Once inside the car, defendant

continued to hold the knife and demanded Norton's car keys (R.
457-58).

Norton handed over the keys and asked where defendant

he was taking her (R. 459). Defendant replied only that she had
"good taste in music" (R. 459). He then asked where the car
likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (1994) defines
an assault as
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
violence, that causes or creates a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
10

Defendant was charged, and the jury instructed under
section 76-5-301(1)(c) (R. 7-8, 95,97).
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lights were, and following Norton's direction, turned them on (R.
459).

Defendant proceeded to put the car into reverse and to

back out of the parking space (R. 460). At this point, Norton
opened the passenger door and "tried to jump out of the car" (R.
460).

Defendant grabbed Norton's ponytail, loosening her

barrette and yanking out several strands of hair (R. 460).
Defendant ordered Norton to get back in the car, but she pushed
away, yelling that she was not going anywhere with defendant (R.
460) .
Defendant does not dispute that Norton was confined for
purposes of the section 76-5-302.

Nor does he dispute that he

intended to inflict bodily injury and/or to terrorize Norton.
Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that the period of
detention in this case, which he claims to be approximately 2 0
seconds, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify his
conviction for aggravated kidnapping.

Br. of App. at 30.

Defendant's claim regarding the significance and
precise length of Norton's confinement is raised for the first
time on appeal11 and is not supported by the record.

Norton

testified that the entire incident lasted approximately five
minutes and that defendant held her inside the car for three to
four minutes before she attempted to escape (R. 466, 510). She
further testified that during that time, she spent approximately
20 seconds looking at defendant's face with the purpose of
identifying him later (R. 461-63).
11

See n.5, supra.
42

Defendant wholly fails to

recognize this uncontradicted

evidence, let alone demonstrate

that it is insufficient to support the jury's verdict.

He has

instead, argued the evidence in the light most favorable to his
position.

This Court is justified in rejecting defendant's

sufficiency challenge on that ground alone.

State v. Scheel, 823

P.2d 470, 473 (UtahApp. 1991).
Further, there is no express requirement in the
aggravated

kidnapping statute that the victim be detained for a

"substantial period."
76-5-302.

Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-301 with

Even assuming such a requirement were to be read into

section 76-5-302, the length of Norton's detention was in fact
"longer than the minimum inherent" in the commission of the
aggravated assault.

Couch, 635 P.2d at 93.

Indeed, the

kidnapping arguably began simultaneously with the aggravated
assault, outside Norton's car.

When the aggravated assault was

completed, the kidnapping continued when defendant forced and
held Norton inside her car for another three to four minutes, or
until Norton's fortuitous escape.

Thus, even under Couch,

Norton's confinement was neither incidental nor subsidiary to the
preceding aggravated assault.

Couch, 635 P.2d at 93. Rather her

further confinement inside the car constitutes an "independent,
separately punishable offense."

Id.

the jury's verdict.
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This Court should affirm

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF A 15 YEAR
MINIMUM MANDATORY TERM IS PRESUMPTIVELY
PROPER
Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302
(1990).

Aggravated kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment for

a minimum mandatory term of five, ten or 15 years and which may
be for life.

Section 76-5-302(3).

Following a sentencing

hearing, the trial court imposed the 15 year minimum mandatory
term (R. 211), finding:
1. That defendant has established instances
of repetitive criminal conduct.
2. That defendant's criminal conduct has
escalated from those against property to
those against the person.
3. That the victim was particularly
vulnerable as she was approached from behind,
at night, while she was in the process of
placing groceries in her motor vehicle.
4. That defendant was armed with a dangerous
weapon which he held to the throat of the
victim.
5. That defendant continues to deny any
involvement in the crime even in the face of
abundant, credible evidence.
(R. 209-10) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum E ) .
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred,
as a matter of law, in finding that the victim in this case was
"vulnerable" for sentencing purposes and argues that he is
thereby entitled to re-sentencing "at the mid-range level of ten
years."

Br. of App. at 32-35.

However, defendant has neither
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provided the Court with an adequate record, nor appropriately
briefed the issue on appeal.

Consequently, the issue is not

properly before the Court.
1.

Failure to Provide an Adequate Record

The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of
Law indicates that the court relied upon the parties' arguments,
defendant's statements, a pre-sentence report, statutory
guidelines and the record of the case in fashioning defendant's
sentence (R. 209), see Addendum E.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201

(Supp. 1994) .12 Defendant has failed to provide this Court with
either a transcript of the sentencing hearing, or a copy of the
pre-sentence report.

Consequently, the record before the Court

is inadequate to address the issue defendant has attempted to
raise on appeal.
Defendant, as the appellant, "has the burden when
raising objections on appeal to see that the record contains the
materials necessary to support his appeal."
709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985).

State v. Theison,

Because this Court "cannot

speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the

Section 76-3-201 (6) (c) provides:
In determining whether there are
circumstances that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may
consider the record in the case, the
probation officer's report, other reports,
including reports received under Section 763-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or
the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
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record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action
of the trial court."

Id.

Indeed, the trial court fulfilled its

statutory obligation by setting forth on the record, the facts
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper minimum mandatory
term.

Section 76-3-201(6)(d).13

Accordingly, in the absence of

record evidence to the contrary, the Court must "presume the
trial court acted correctly" in imposing the 15 year minimum
mandatory period.
2•

Theison, 709 P.2d at 309.

Waiver

The missing record further hampers the Court's ability
to determine if this issue was properly preserved below.

It is

simply not possible, based on the record before the Court, to
determine precisely what arguments were presented to the trial
court at the sentencing hearing.
memorandum with the court.

Neither party filed sentencing

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

201(6) (b) .14
"Generally, a defendant who fails to bring an issue
before the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on
appeal."

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.

Section 76-3-201 (6) (d) provides:
The court shall set forth on the record the
facts supporting and reasons for imposing
the upper or lower term.
Section 76-3-201 (6) (b) provides:
Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either
party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts.
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1991).

A "general objection" to a trial court's imposition of

sentence is insufficient to preserve issues for appeal.
Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991).

State v.

The requirement of a

specific objection on the record is necessary to ensure "that the
trial court will have an opportunity to correct any errors," and
to assure "that the appellate court will have a record of the
grounds asserted below."

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16

(Utah 1989) .
3.

Failure to Adequately Brief Issue

Finally, this Court should decline to consider this
issue because defendant's brief fails to comply with the
requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Utah R. App. 24 (j) ("[b]riefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court").
See also State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 1992)
(refusing to consider Price's argument on appeal due to noncompliance with rule 24). As noted previously, defendant fails
to demonstrate where in the record this issue was preserved
below.

Utah R. App. 24(a)(5).15

Further, defendant's assertion

of trial court error is devoid of supporting legal authority.

Rule 24(a)(5)(A)-(B) requires:
citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
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Utah R. App. 24 (a) (9) .16

See Price, 827 P.2d at 249-50/ State

v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to reach
merits of issue on appeal due to inadequate factual and legal
analysis).
CONCLUSION
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s - g Q day of December, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

IAN DECKER
fssistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
MARY C. CORPORAN, CORPORAN & WILLIAMS, attorney for appellant,
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah
I

this £&\

day of December, 1994.
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16

Rule 24(a)(9) requires:
An argument. The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including
the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

RLKKS7IUCT COURT
MARK R. MOFFAT (#5112)
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

DEC 0 2 1993
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

Defendant.
The

931901556FS

defendant,

CLIFFORD

PERRY,

by

and

through

his

attorney of record, MARK R. MOFFAT, moves the court to suppress
statements of Susan Norton relating to her identification of
Clifford Perry as the suspect in this case. Mr. Perry submits that
the "show up" identification procedure employed by the police on
September 21, 1993 at 4333 South Rose Garden Lane was unduly
suggestive

and

unreliable.

Any

subsequent

identification,

including any in-court identification, is necessarily tainted and
is thus inadmissible.

Ms. Norton's in-court identification of

defendant would be violative of Mr. Perry's due process rights as
guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the

0000-2-?' IJ

"v©ri

Utah Constitution. See Neil v. Bioaers. 409 U.S. 188 (1972) ; State
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
DATED this

^

day of December, 1993.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

Attorney for Defendant
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this

day of December, 1993.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

'
Case No. 931901556FS

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,

'
»

Hon. Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification,
filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for hearing before
the Court on January 12, 1994, at 8:30 a.m..

Defendant was

present and represented by counsel, Mark R. Moffat, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association, and the State of Utah was represented
by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
In

his

Motion,

defendant

alleges

the

"show

up"

identification procedure employed by the Salt Lake City Police,
on the night of the crime and shortly after his arrest, was
unduly

suggestive

and

unreliable.

Defendant

claims

any

subsequent identification, including any in-court identification,
is necessarily tainted and inadmissible thus violating his due
process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and FourtQft&J 6nt^WeYiliii' 5

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 931901556FS
Page 2

to the United States Constitution

in addition to Article I

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

Testimony was received from

Susan Norton and Officer Joseph

Cyr, Salt Lake

City Police

Department.
The case was argued by counsel and submitted to the Court.
Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That

defendant

was

charged

by

Information

with

Aggravated Kidnapping, a First Degree Felony.
2.

That shortly after midnight on September 21, 1993, Susan

Norton was shopping at Smith's Food King, 2135 South 900 East,
Salt Lake City.
3.

That Ms. Norton's automobile was parked in the Smith's

lot within five feet of one of the outdoor lights used to
illuminate the parking lot.
4.

That as Ms. Norton was entering her automobile after

shopping, a male approached her from behind and held a knife to
her throat.
5.

That the male ordered Ms. Norton to enter her automobile

from the driver's side.

000|

62

000U7

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 931901556FS
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6.

That the male ordered Ms. Norton to slide over to the

passenger seat and then the former placed himself in the driver's
seat.
7.

That

the male ordered Ms. Norton

to give him the

ignition keys.
8.

That the male started the engine and commented on Ms.

Norton's choice in music as the radio came on when the automobile
started.
9.

That the male asked Ms. Norton where the automobile

headlight switch was located.
10. That the male turned on the automobile's headlights and
placed the gears in reverse.
11. That as the male began backing out of the parking place,
Ms. Norton opened the passenger door and tried to exit.
12. That

the male

grabbed

Ms. Norton

by her

hair and

attempted to keep her in the automobile.
13. That Ms. Norton was able to break free from the male.
14.
enlisted

That
the

Ms. Norton
help

of

ran

another

away

from

her

automobile

individual

who

had

and

also been

shopping.
15. That while in her automobile with the male who had the
knife, Ms. Norton was sitting within two feet of that male.
16. That Ms. Norton's automobile was su0gcQdi^^r^TlU^|t^^
for her to see the male's features.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 931901556FS
Page 4

17. That Ms. Norton was afraid but not so terrified as not
to observe the male's features.
18. That Ms. Norton observed the male from profile and
three-quarters view.
19. That Ms. Norton observed the male for a total period of
ten to twenty seconds while the former was in her automobile.
20. That Ms. Norton observed the male with some thought of
being able to later identify him.
21. That Ms. Norton stated the male was wearing white socks
and no shoes.
22. That Ms. Norton identified the male as being a member of
the Caucasian race, the same race as Ms. Norton.
23. That Ms. Norton was seated in her automobile with the
male for at least one minute.
24. That Ms. Norton had no problems with her vision and was
able to see clearly.
25. That after Ms. Norton broke away from the male, the
latter
Cadillac

exited
which

her
had

automobile
been

and

parked

entered
in

front

an
of

older,
Ms.

yellow

Norton's

automobile.
26. That the male drove away in the yellow Cadillac.
27. That others in the parking lot observed Ms. Norton break
away from the male and heard her screamsQQft I r i

fiflfi
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28.

That

two

individuals

in

the

parking

lot,

who

had

observed what happened, followed the yellow Cadillac and obtained
its license plate number.
29. That the address of the Cadillac's registered owner was
ascertained.
30. That Salt Lake City Police Officers responded to the
registered owner's address less than two hours after the abovedescribed incident and discovered the yellow Cadillac nearby.
31. That the police made contact with a male within the home
who generally >atched the description of the male who had been in
Norton's automobile.
32. That there was evidence within the home which indicated
the male was the individual who drove away from Smith's in the
yellow Cadillac.
33. That the male suspect was escorted outside of the home
by the police.
34. That the male suspect, defendant Clifford W. Perry, was
not handcuffed when he was taken outside of the home.
35. That at least two police officers were next to defendant
when he was outside of the home.
36. That Ms. Norton was seated in the front passenger seat
of Officer Joseph Cyr's police vehicle.
37.

That Officer Cyr asked Ms. Norton to lookft gtrj tilAfr»*^r>

he would illuminate and see if she recognized him.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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38.

That

Officer

Cyr

drove

Ms.

Norton

to

within

approximately eighty feet of defendant.
39. That Officer Cyr trained his vehicle's spotlight and
high beam headlights on defendant.
40. That Ms. Norton told Officer Cyr that defendant appeared
to be the male who had forced her into her automobile.
41. That Officer Cyr drove closer to defendant stopping at a
distance of approximately forty feet.
42. That Ms. Norton then told Officer Cyr that she was
positive defendant was the male who had forced her into her
automobile.
43. That defendant was subsequently arrested.
44.

That

there was nothing blatantly

suggestive

in the

manner in which the "show up" was conducted.
45. That there was nothing unduly prejudicial in the manner
in which the "show up" was conducted.
46. That there were only minor inconsistencies in the way
Ms. Norton described the male while she was still at the Smith's
Food King parking lot and the actual description of defendant as
he appeared at the "show up11.
47. That Ms. Norton had sufficient prior opportunity to
observe and

identify defendant independent of the "show up"

identification.
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CONCLUSION OF LAW;
Based

on

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact,

the

Court

concludes, as a matter of law, that the defendant's due process
rights

were

not

violated

by

the

"show

up"

identification

procedure employed by the police.
DATED this ^ *~ day of

THE HONOI
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Mark R. Moffat
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law and Order were
mailed to Mark R. Moffat, Attorney for Defendant Clifford W.
Perry, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 on the ^V.-^May of January, 1994.
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Attorney for Defendant
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310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

-VS-

Case No. 931901556FS

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
DEFENDANT TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED ACTION, by and through his
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby moves and petitions the
above court to grant the defendant a new trial in this action.
This motion is made to the court pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
IN

SUPPORT

OF

THIS

MOTION,

defendant

relies

upon

his

memorandum of points and authorities and his affidavit filed in
conjunction herewith.

ooouft.'>;9-

DATED THIS

Z>\

day of

Apr! 1

, 1994

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY" C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVEfiY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused
the

foregoing MOTION, to be served

upon

plaintiff

by hand-

delivering a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope
addressed to:
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the

!_ day of

CjyJZ

, 1994.

0

fo^-Af

^

T
Secretary
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR
MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

K
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6ALT LAKE COUNTY
Lt^Uty Cidik

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 931901556FS

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
DEFENDANT TO THE ABOVE-CAPTION, by and through counsel his
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby submits the following
as his memorandum of points and authorities in support of his
motion for a new trial.

FACTS OF THE CASE
1.

Defendant was tried in this matter in January 1994. He

was convicted by a jury verdict of guilty on January 13, 1994.
2.

Defendant's former counsel in this case was Mr. Mark

Moffat of the Legal Defender's Association.
3.

Defendant advised Mr. Moffat of substantArtn<^<tej}qe

which would tend to be exculpatory of the defendant in this action,

including the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the offense,
and two alibi witnesses who would testify

in behalf

of the

defendant,
4.

Defendant's

counsel

failed

to

investigate

this

information and failed to present this information to the court as
a defense in this case.

ARGUMENT
The defendant is not only entitled to the appointment of
counsel to represent him in this case, he is entitled to effective
assistance of that counsel. State of Utah v. Carter, 233 U.A.R. 18
(Utah, 1994).

To prevail n a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, defendant must show that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance

in some demonstrable manner which

fell below an

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and that
counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. State v. Germanto. 226
U.A.R. 3 (Utah, November 15, 1993.)
Defendant did not have effective assistance of counsel during
the trial, in that the defendant gave substantial exculpatory
information to counsel, which was not investigated and which was
not presented to the jury.

Failure to investigate an alibi is

clearly both below a standard of performance for a defense counsel
and prejudice to defendant.

DMOJISE
2

The failure of defense counsel to consider, investigate and
present significant exculpatory evidence to the jury at the time of
trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Because of

the ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is entitled to a
new trial in this action, as prayed in his motion.
DATED THIS

/

day of

ftpf'\

1

, 1994.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY^C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant

ooffrmj

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused
the foregoing MEMORANDUM, to be served upon plaintiff by handdelivering a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope
addressed to:
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the _J

day of

^ A A

, 1994.

ljlt LKjJJ*

Secretary
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

'

CLIFFORD W. PERRY,

}

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION
OF LAW
Case No. 93190155fFS

,

Hon. Frank G. Noe±

Defendant.

Defendant's

Motion

For New

Trial,

filed

in

the above-

entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on May 10,
1994,

at 3:00 p.m..

Defendant was present and represented by

counsel, Mary C. Corporon, Corporon and Williams, and the State
of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake
County Attorney.

Testimony was received from defendant and Mark

R. Moffat, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.
The Motion was argued by counsel and submitted to the Court.
Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law:

000221,

-Q02:0

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 931901556FS
Page 2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated
Kidnapping, a First Degree Felony.
2.

That defendant was tried before a jury on January 12-13,

1994, and found guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping.
3.

That

Mark

R.

Moffat,

Salt

Lake

Legal

Defender

Association, represented defendant at trial.
4.

That subsequent to the trial, defendant dismissed Mr.

Moffat.
5.

That on January 21, 1994, defendant, acting pro se,

filed a handwritten Motion For New Trial.
6.

That defendant's January 21, 1994 Motion was based on:
(a)

"That

the

statute

that

the

said

defendant

was

convicted of was not based upon the facts of the trial and that
there should have been a lessor

(sic) offense for the jury to

have considered. ..."
(b) That because a jury in a capital case consists of
twelve members, it was error that defendant's jury only consisted
of eight members.
(c) That the identification process at arrest, pretrial
and trial was, "suggestive, coerced and pre-judice (sic).11
(d)

That

potential

jury

members

heard

conversing about defendant which may have tainte
and biased them against defendant.

witnesses

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Case No. 931901556FS
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7.

That in its Minute Entry of January 28, 1994, the Court

addressed the January 21, 1994 Motion, point-by-point, and denied
the same.
8.
1994

That subsequent to the denial of defendant's January 21,

Motion,

Mary

C.

Corporon

was

appointed

counsel

for

defendant.
9.

That on April

1, 1994, Ms. Corporon

filed

a second

Motion For New Trial based on the claims in defendant's Affidavit
filed with the Motion.
10. That, in his Affidavit, defendant claims:
(a) That he had been in a bar until approximately 12:30
a.m., which was after the offense had been committed.
(b) That several alibi witnesses could place him in the
bar until 12:30 a.m..
(c) That Mr. Moffat neither investigated his alibi nor
presented it to the jury.
(d) That he had loaned the keys to his motor vehicle to
a fellow patron of the bar at some time between 11:00 p.m. and
11:30 p.m.
(e) That the individual to whom he loaned his motor
vehicle matched the description of the assailant as given by the
victim.
(f) That he was present
offense occurred.

in the b a £ ffe*> & p « Trtire the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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(g) That his motor vehicle was not present at the bar
at the time the offense occurred.
(h) That he has a very pronounced southern accent, the
assailant had no accent and neither did the bar patron to whom he
loaned his motor vehicle.
11.

That, at the Hearing on the instant Motion, Mr. Moffat

testified:
(a) That, during preparation for trial, defendant told
Mr. Moffat the former departed the bar in his motor vehicle at
approximately 11:45 p.m..
(b) That defendant told Mr. Moffat he had witnesses
which

could

place

him

in

the

bar

the

evening

the

offense

occurred.
(c) That defendant told Mr. Moffat he was driving his
motor

vehicle

in

the

vicinity

of

the

location

the

offense

occurred.
(d) That defendant never told Mr. Moffat he had loaned
his motor vehicle to another bar patron, prior to the time the
offense occurred, nor the name of that patron.
(e)

That

Mr.

Moffat

directed

his

investigator

to

concentrate the investigator's efforts on plaintiff's witnesses
and

their

written

statements

because

defendant

bflcfl (fc^ffijf M r -

Otjvzirj

Moffat he drove his motor vehicle away from the bar approximately
one-half hour before the offense occurred.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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(f)

That

because

of

defendant's

statements

to

Mr.

Moffat, witnesses at the bar could only place defendant thereat
until 11:45 p.m., and any testimony by these witnesses would not
be helpful to defendant at trial.
12.

That, at the jury trial, witnesses testified:
(a) That the offense occurred at approximately

12:15

a.m. .
(b) That the assailant drove away from the location,
where the offense occurred, in an older Cadillac.
(c)

That

the

Cadillac's

license

plate

number

was

reported to the police.
(d)

That

the

victim

provided

the

police

with

a

description of the assailant.
(e) That, on his feet, the assailant was wearing white
socks only.
(f) That
older

Cadillac

the police

bearing

the

determined

reported

the

license

location
plate

of

the

number

and

which was parked next to the home in which defendant was located.
(g) That the police made contact with defendant who
generally matched the description given by the victim.
(h) That white socks, which appeared to have road dirt
on the soles, was discovered among defendant's clothing.
(i) That defendant made incriminating

st

^ f f n % 9 ffibout

going to jail, before he was arrested, and that the victim was a

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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woman without being told the victim was female or having seen the
victim.
(j)

That

the

victim

identified

defendant

as

her

told the police he was the

only

assailant in a "show up."
(k) That defendant

person who drove the older Cadillac that evening".
13.

That

defendant

easily

could

have

driven

from

the

location of the bar to the location where the offense occurred
between 11:45 p.m. and 12:15 a.m..
14.

That, upon his arrest, defendant

did not

tell

the

police he had loaned his motor vehicle to a bar patron.
15.

That, at the Hearing on the instant Motion, defendant

testified:
(a) That he had not told Mr. Moffat the identity of the
bar patron who borrowed his motor vehicle.
(b) That he did not presently know the whereabouts of
the bar patron.
16.

That it is not credible defendant would not have told

Mr. Moffat a bar patron had borrowed his motor vehicle and the
identity of that patron.
17.

That

Mr.

Moffat

did

not

expend

resources,

in

interviewing the bar witnesses who could place defend^Dt: at the
bar

until

11:45

p.m.,

is

reasonable

in

view

of

del{$xj$feZQ

admission to Mr. Moffat that he departed the bar at that time.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
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18.

That there is abundant eyewitness testimony, physical

evidence and incriminating statements by defendant upon which the
jury could base its verdict of guilty.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based
concludes,

on

the

foregoing

as a matter

of

Findings

law, that

of
there

Fact,

the

Court

is no error or

impropriety in this matter which had a substantial adverse effect
upon the rights of defendant and that it is not in the interest
of justice to grant defendant a
a new
new trial,
trial.
DATED this

d7

day of

THE HO^I^Ii&^FRANK G\ NOEL
Third tri-s^rlct Court Judge
Approved as to form:
//

Ma&yt. Corporon
Counsel for Defendant

A* L* /I *

OOO23(p£02le
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify that

a true and correct

copy of the

foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Mary C. Corporon, Counsel

for Defendant

Clifford W. Perry, at 310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101 on this^gyf day of May, 1994.

i—'•• ,' M .
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

" : '.•^"«?
- ,r';nct
MAY 0 2 1994
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•: TV

I^JSJ&fcUAr., ,
v

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION
OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 931901556FS
CLIFFORD W. PERRY,
Hon.

Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
Defendant's Sentencing, based on a jury conviction for the
crime of Aggravated Kidnapping, came on before the Court on April
1, 1994, at 10:30 a.m..
appointed

Defendant was present and represented by

counsel, Mary C. Corporon of Corporon and Williams,

Salt Lake City, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth
R%.% Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
In

accordance

with

§76-5-302(3),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Aggravated Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree punishable
by a term which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5,
10,

or 15 years and which may be for life.

201(6) (a),
which

Utah

Code Annotated

the defendant

states,

w

Additionally, §76-3[i]f a statute

under

was convicted mandates that one of three

000208-CJ;stated minimum

terms

shall be

imposed, the court

shall '• order
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imposition

of

the

term of middle severity unless there are

circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."
Counsel for the State of Utah presented circumstances in
aggravation and argued for the most severe minimum term.
for

defendant

argued

for

the

least

severe

minimum

Counsel
term.

Defendant made a statement in which he denied any involvement in
the crime for which he was convicted.
In determining whether a minimum term other than that of
middle severity shall be imposed, the Court considered the record
in the case, the Presentence Investigation Report from Adult
Probation and Parole, the statements at the hearing presented by
counsel and defendant, and the guidelines referred to in §76-3201(6) (e) , Utah Code Annotated.
Being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the
following

Findings

of

Fact

relative

to

circumstances

in

aggravation and the Conclusion of Law based thereon:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That defendant has established instances of repetitive

criminal conduct.
2.

That defendant's criminal conduct has escalated from

those against property to those against the person.
3-

That the victim was particularly vulnerable as she was

000209,, ,
approached from behind, at night, while she was ©4 oh^y^ocess of
placing groceries in her motor vehicle.
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4.

That defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon which

he held to the throat of the victim.
5.

That defendant continues to deny any involvement in the

crime even in the face of abundant, credible evidence.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based

on

concludes,

as

the
a

foregoing

matter

aggravation which

of

Findings

law, there

of
are

Fact,

the

circumstances

in

justify the imposition of the most severe

minimum term of 15 years.
DATED this

Court

/ ^ day of April, 1994.

Approved as to form:

mf /

MkifyJ C. C^rporon
C o u n s e l l o r Defendant

0002.1.0

